Analysis of the Phenomenon of Disinformation in the Digital and Community Sphere (2025–2026)
Analytical Study – Social Cohesion, Disinformation & Human Rights
By the ACHA France Editorial Team
ABSTRACT
This study analyzes the phenomenon of local rumors in Besançon and their impact on social cohesion in a multicultural city. It examines the types of misinformation, digital dissemination channels, targeted populations, and the mechanisms by which rumors are transformed into hate speech. It introduces the first ACHA Local Rumor Index (IARL), a periodic measurement tool designed to track the evolution of the phenomenon and guide prevention policies.
Besançon, novembre 2024. Un message WhatsApp circule dans plusieurs groupes d’habitants : « Un camp de migrants va être installé dans le quartier Planoise. La mairie a décidé en secret. » En moins de 48 heures, le message est partagé des centaines de fois. Des habitants inquiets appellent la mairie.
Des tensions émergent sur les réseaux locaux. La rumeur est fausse. Mais le mal est fait. Cette étude part de ce constat : dans une ville comme Besançon, où la diversité culturelle est une réalité quotidienne, les rumeurs ne sont pas de simples malentendus. Elles peuvent devenir des armes silencieuses contre la paix sociale.
- Definitions and Conceptual Framework
1.1 What is a rumor?
A rumor is unverified information that circulates within a social group, usually in the absence of reliable or official sources. It differs from misinformation—an unintentional error—and disinformation—a deliberate lie. In today’s digital landscape, these three categories overlap and feed into one another.
Gordon Allport and Leo Postman, in their seminal work *The Psychology of Rumor* (1947), established that the intensity of a rumor is proportional to its perceived importance multiplied by the ambiguity of the situation. This formula remains strikingly relevant today: social, economic, and migration crises create precisely the conditions of ambiguity in which rumors thrive.
1.2 Besançon: A Prime Case Study
Besançon has several characteristics that make it a particularly relevant case study for the analysis of local rumors. With a population of approximately 120,057, a significant portion of whom are immigrants—notably about 15,000 Muslims, representing 13% of the population—and 17 priority neighborhoods under the urban policy in the Doubs department, the city is a hotbed of social tensions that fuel rumors.
Its medium size allows for the rapid flow of information within local networks, while maintaining a sufficiently vibrant community and institutional life to generate counter-narratives. It is this delicate balance between social tensions and resources that this study aims to document.
- Types of Local Rumors in Besançon
2.1 Mapping of Key Themes
An analysis of local Facebook groups, Nextdoor feeds, and Telegram channels identified in the Besançon metropolitan area reveals six main categories of recurring rumors between 2024 and 2026.
– The 6 categories of rumors identified in Besançon (2024–2026)
- Rumors about migration – secret facilities, alleged criminal activity, and controversial priority housing.
- Security rumors – fabricated or exaggerated attacks, so-called “no-go zones.”
- Religious rumors – alleged Islamization, street prayers, influence on institutions.
- Social rumors – fictitious benefits granted to foreigners at the expense of the French.
- Health-related rumors—imported diseases, unsanitary conditions in certain neighborhoods.
- School rumors – fabricated incidents, refusal to integrate, altered curricula.
These six narratives share a common structure: they portray an external group (migrants, Muslims, foreigners) as a threat to an internal group (long-time residents, native-born French). This pattern reflects what social psychologists call the perceived threat bias—a cognitive tendency to perceive the unknown as dangerous.
2.2 The Life Cycle of a Local Rumor
Rumors in Besançon follow a documented four-phase cycle. Germination—originating in a WhatsApp group or an informal conversation. Amplification—shared on local Facebook groups and Telegram channels. Normalization—picked up by accounts with a large local following, which present it as verified. Dispersion—widespread circulation until saturation or an official denial.
This cycle lasts an average of 72 to 96 hours for rumors with a strong emotional impact. When a denial is issued, it generally takes two to three times longer to spread than the original rumor—a phenomenon documented by communication science research under the term “asymmetry of diffusion.”
89% of French people are unable to spot fake news – average score of 5.4/20 on the Anti-Fake News quiz (Ifop) (Ifop survey for Cision, February 2026, 2,000 respondents)
III. Channels of dissemination: an anatomy of a disinformation network
3.1 Facebook – the local echo chamber
Facebook remains the dominant platform for spreading local rumors in Besançon. Closed groups dedicated to specific neighborhoods—Planoise Actus, Besançon Ma Ville, Besançon Infos Non Officielles—serve as semi-private spaces where unverified information circulates under the guise of community legitimacy.
Facebook’s algorithmic structure amplifies posts that elicit strong emotional reactions—outrage, fear, anger. Rumors related to security or immigration specifically trigger these reactions, which explains why they spread faster than factual corrections.
3.2 WhatsApp and Telegram – The Space of the Unspoken
WhatsApp and Telegram are the second most common channels for spreading information, characterized by their lack of transparency. Telegram channels and WhatsApp groups for neighborhoods, parent-teacher associations, and local organizations serve as spaces where rumors circulate without any possibility of external moderation.
The lack of institutional oversight and the interpersonal trust that characterizes these spaces reinforce the perceived credibility of the information shared. A rumor received via the school’s parent WhatsApp group is instinctively deemed more reliable than a news article—even if the content is identical.
3.3 TikTok – Accelerated Virality
TikTok is an emerging platform that is particularly popular among people under 35. Its recommendation algorithm, which is based on emotional engagement rather than the user’s self-reported identity, exposes users to polarizing content regardless of their initial preferences.
Popular regional social media accounts regularly share unverified information about the security or social situation in Besançon, reaching audiences who do not follow local Facebook groups.
3.4 Anonymous Accounts and Generative AI
In 2024–2025, a new phenomenon emerged in Besançon: the circulation of content generated by artificial intelligence—fake images, fake testimonials, and fake local news articles—shared by anonymous accounts. This content is technically difficult to distinguish from genuine testimonials, which accelerates its spread and complicates efforts to debunk it.
$400 billion estimated global cost of misinformation in 2024 — damage to reputation, fraud, loss of trust (Les Echos / Cision, 2024)
- Target populations: Who are the victims of rumors?
An analysis of the rumors circulating in Besançon reveals that they are concentrated among specific groups, whose social vulnerability is often correlated with the frequency and intensity of the rumors targeting them.
– Primary target populations – ACHA France field data for 2025–2026
Muslim community: the main group targeted, accounting for 40% of rumors with religious overtones.
Migrants and asylum seekers: the targets of 55% of rumors related to security and social issues.
Jewish community: targeted by anti-Semitic rumors, which have been on the rise since 2023.
Young people in priority neighborhoods: associated with rumors of delinquency and insecurity.
Women wearing headscarves: personally targeted in 30% of incidents documented online.
Ukrainian and African refugees: the subject of rumors regarding preferential social benefits.
This mapping of targets reveals a pattern of selective victimization. Groups that are least likely to respond publicly—due to language barriers, fears of reprisal, or a lack of media representation—are systematically overrepresented among the victims of rumors.
The CNCDH reports a 3.6-fold increase in anti-Semitic acts in France between 2022 and 2024. Islamophobic acts recorded by the CCIE increased by 25% in 2024. These national data are reflected in the reality in Besançon, where ACHA France has documented a temporal correlation between the circulation of targeted rumors and reported hate incidents.
- Impact on Social Stability – Measuring the Invisible
5.1 The Erosion of Interpersonal Trust
The primary impact of rumors on social harmony is the erosion of trust between groups. A resident of Planoise who has read that “the immigrants in his neighborhood are responsible for the burglaries” will view his neighbors of foreign origin differently—even if the rumor is false and he himself doubts it.
This mechanism—which sociologists call the cognitive contagion effect—is particularly insidious because it operates even when the individual consciously rejects the rumor. Merely being exposed to it is enough to alter patterns of perception.
5.2 The Impact on Local Institutions
Rumors also undermine trust in local institutions. The Besançon City Hall, social services, law enforcement, and schools are regularly the target of rumors about their decisions or practices.
This institutional mistrust is well documented at the national level: according to Sciences Po’s 2025 Trust Barometer, only 32% of French people trust local institutions to manage integration. In Besançon, grassroots organizations report increasing difficulty in mobilizing residents of working-class neighborhoods for community meetings—a symptom of mistrust that manifests itself notably in a refusal to engage in civic life.
32% of French people trust local institutions to manage integration—down 8 points since 2020 (Sciences Po / CEVIPOF Trust Barometer 2025)
5.3 The Rumor-Hate Continuum
In its previous studies, ACHA France has documented the continuum between rumors and hate speech. A relatively neutral initial rumor—“There are a lot of foreigners in this neighborhood”—can, through successive amplification, turn into a hateful statement—“Foreigners are invading our neighborhoods and stealing our children.”
This process of narrative contamination follows the same pattern as ideological radicalization: repeated exposure to slightly distorted content within a trusted environment (such as a family WhatsApp group or a neighborhood group) gradually normalizes increasingly hostile views.
- Case Studies — Five Documented Rumors from Besançon (2024–2026)
Case 1 – The Rumor of the Planoise Secret Camp (November 2024)
A WhatsApp message claiming that a migrant camp had been secretly set up in Planoise spread across dozens of local groups within 48 hours. The town hall received more than 200 calls in two days. It took 72 hours for the official denial to circulate, and it reached only a fraction of the initial audience.
Analysis: A rumor with strong security overtones, exploiting the vulnerability of the QPV neighborhood. No factual basis. Spread: WhatsApp → Facebook → TikTok. Frequency of hostile acts against people perceived as migrants in the days that followed: +40% according to local organizations.
Case 2 – Rumors of the Islamization of schools (March 2025)
A post claims that an elementary school in Besançon has dropped history lessons on the Crusades under pressure from Muslim parents. The story has been picked up by several regional accounts with large followings. The school principal has publicly denied the claim. Six months later, the rumor continues to circulate.
Analysis: A rumor with strong identity-based undertones, intended to sow division among parents. Spread: Telegram → Facebook → local media. Impact: Tensions were reported at a parent-teacher meeting, with two verbal altercations noted.
Case 3 – The Rumor About Preferential Subsidies (October 2024)
A Facebook post claims that asylum seekers receive €1,800 per month in social benefits, compared to €800 for French retirees. These figures are false. The post was shared 3,400 times in the metropolitan area before being reported and removed.
Analysis: A highly viral rumor that relies on an unfair comparison. Target: Migrants and asylum seekers. Distribution: Facebook exclusively. Impact: 12 PHAROS reports; a surge in hostile comments on local government pages.
Case 4 – The Rumor of the Forbidden District (June 2025)
A TikTok video from an anonymous account claims that certain streets in Besançon are “controlled by foreign gangs” and advises French people not to go there. The video racked up 45,000 views in 48 hours. The facts described are inaccurate.
Analysis: Rumor with a significant impact on local appeal and tourism. Spread: TikTok → local networks. Impact: A documented decline in foot traffic at local businesses over the course of a week, according to merchants surveyed by ACHA France.
Case 5 – The Fake Image Generated by AI (January 2026)
An AI-generated image purportedly depicting an “altercation between migrants and law enforcement in Besançon” is circulating with a caption that pinpoints the city’s location. The image is technically very convincing. Regional media outlets have been contacted for verification. The image is a deepfake.
Analysis: First documented case of disinformation using generative AI in Besançon. Spread: Telegram → Facebook → attempted media coverage thwarted. This marks a new phase in the evolution of local disinformation tools.
VII. Digital Analysis – Key Metrics
▬ Key metrics on local disinformation in Besançon (2024–2026)
Most frequently used keywords in rumors: migrants (38%), Islamization (22%), insecurity (19%), social assistance (15%), schools (6%).
Most active platforms: Facebook (45%), WhatsApp (30%), Telegram (15%), TikTok (10%).
Peak hours: 7:00 PM–10:00 PM on weekdays, 10:00 AM–1:00 PM on weekends.
Average time in circulation before being debunked: 72 to 96 hours.
Ratio of rumor circulation to denial circulation: 1 to 3 (denials circulate three times less).
Percentage of anonymous accounts in the distribution: 45% of initial shares.
This data, collected by ACHA France using the Center’s digital monitoring tools and reports from partner organizations, constitutes the first local quantitative database on the phenomenon of rumors in Besançon.
They confirm a well-documented national trend: emotionally charged content spreads six times faster than neutral, factual content (MIT study, 2018, updated 2024). At the local level, this effect is amplified by the small size of the networks through which information spreads—a single WhatsApp group can reach residents of several neighborhoods at the same time.
VIII. The Role of Local Institutions – Between Response and Prevention
An analysis of the role of local institutions in Besançon in addressing rumors reveals a structural gap between their ability to detect rumors and their ability to respond to them.
The City of Besançon has a responsive communications department capable of issuing official denials within a matter of hours. However, these denials are primarily shared through official channels—such as the city hall website and the official Facebook page—which do not reach the spaces where rumors circulate (closed groups, private messaging).
Schools are particularly vulnerable to rumors about school life and student integration. In March 2025, the Besançon School District organized its first seminar, “Taking Action Against Discrimination,” thereby acknowledging the link between rumors, discrimination, and tensions in schools.
Community-based organizations—including the Blanchisserie du Refuge, the Planoise community centers, and organizations within Besançon’s Muslim community—play a crucial role as an informal counterweight: they debunk rumors in the areas where they circulate, with a credibility that official institutions lack.
- The ACHA Local Rumor Index (IARL)
ACHA France proposes the creation of a periodic measurement tool—the ACHA Local Rumor Index (IARL)—designed to quantify and track the phenomenon of rumors in Besançon over time.
▶ Components of the IARL — Version 1.0
I1 – Propagation Index: Volume of unverified content detected by SENTINEL during the period (monthly).
I2 – Risk Index: proportion of rumors with hateful or discriminatory content (0–100).
I3 – Targeting Index: diversity and vulnerability of targeted groups (0–100).
I4 – Speed Index: average time between transmission and first mass sharing (hours).
I5 – Institutional Resistance Index: average time for an official response and scope of the denial.
IARL Global = weighted average of I1 through I5 – published every six months by ACHA France.
The first IARL will be published in December 2026, following six months of data collection via the SENTINEL platform. It will be the first index of its kind in Bourgogne-Franche-Comté and one of the few nationwide for a mid-sized city.
Recommendations from ACHA France
- Establish a municipal task force to monitor and respond quickly to rumors
The City of Besançon should establish a dedicated task force, bringing together communications departments, community centers, and local organizations, capable of identifying and countering rumors within 24 hours of their emergence—by taking direct action in the digital spaces where they circulate.
- Incorporate media literacy into the school curriculum starting in elementary school
The Besançon school district is expected to roll out media and information literacy (MIL) programs across all grades starting in elementary school, with a focus on verifying sources, detecting deepfakes, and understanding how rumors spread.
- Supporting local organizations as the first line of defense against rumors
Community-based organizations operating in priority neighborhoods have a capacity to verify information that official institutions lack. They must be funded, trained, and equipped to serve as community watchdogs for information.
- Publish the ACHA Local Rumor Index twice a year
ACHA France is committed to publishing the IARL in June and December of each year, in partnership with local institutions, to provide public policymakers and civil society actors with an empirical basis for their prevention policies.
- Create a reporting protocol accessible to all residents
A simple system—via phone, an online form, or in-person at city hall—that allows residents to report rumors they hear, with a verified response provided within 48 hours. This system should be available in French, Arabic, and English.
Sources and references
Field data and local sources
– ACHA France – SENTINEL Digital Monitoring Platform, Besançon Metropolitan Area, 2024–2026 (exclusive data)
– City of Besançon – 2024 Social Needs Assessment (CCAS Besançon / AUDAB)
– INSEE – Analyses of Bourgogne-Franche-Comté No. 122: 62 QPVs, 17 in the Doubs (2024)
– France Bleu Besançon – Islam in Besançon: approximately 15,000 followers (2024 data)
– Besançon Academy – Seminar on Combating Discrimination (March 2025)
National sources
– Ifop survey for Cision – 89% of French people feel helpless in the face of misinformation, with a rating of 5.4 out of 20 (February 2026, 2,000 respondents)
– CNCDH – 2024 Annual Report: 3,144 hate crimes, a 3.6-fold increase in anti-Semitic acts compared to 2022
– CCIE – 1,037 documented Islamophobic incidents in France in 2024 (+25%)
– PHAROS – Reports of online hate speech: up 55% between 2023 and 2024
– Sciences Po/CEVIPOF 2025 Confidence Barometer: 32% trust in local institutions
Academic sources
– Allport, G. & Postman, L. (1947). The Psychology of Rumor. Henry Holt, New York.
– Vosoughi, S., Roy, D., & Aral, S. (2018). The spread of true and false news online. Science, 359(6380), 1146–1151. (MIT)
– Wardle, C. & Derakhshan, H. (2017). Information Disorder: Toward an Interdisciplinary Framework for Research and Policymaking. Council of Europe.
– Les Echos / Cision (2024) – Global cost of misinformation: $400 billion in 2024